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Abstract
This paper analyzes scal and monetary policy interaction in a simple policy game with
debt and output shocks. Seigniorage provides revenue for the government but results in an
ination{bias. We analyze three mechanisms designed to eliminate some or all of the biases
in monetary policy: an ination performance contract, ination target (both contingent
on the stock of debt), and a zero{ination rule. The performance contract and ination
target result in higher interest rate, remove all biases in monetary policy and achieve the
pre{commitment policy, hence they are equivalent. The rst two solutions also yield a
higher expected welfare than a zero{ination policy.
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In a standard monetary policy game, a well{known result is that the time{inconsistency of
monetary policy results in a positive ination{bias. Without a proper commitment device, a
pre{commitment ination policy is not credible.1 This is because, after ination expectations
(and, perhaps, wage contracts) have been formed by economic agents, the central bank has
an incentive to renege on the pre{commitment policy in order to increase output or reduce
unemployment. If economic agents are forward{looking, this leads to average ination rates
above what is desired by society.
Years after these results have been shown by Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro and
Gordon (1983), there is still on{going research on institutional designs that can be used to
improve this dynamically inconsistent monetary policy. The seminal work in this direction
was by Rogo (1985). He showed that delegating monetary policy to a central banker with a
higher weight on the achievement of low ination than the government can reduced the degree
of bias in ination. Rogo's weight{conservative central banker solution however results in
suboptimal stabilization of output shocks. Lohmann (1992) extended the analysis in Rogo
(1985) to include the possibility of the government overriding the central bank's policy, but at
a cost. The threat to override causes the the bank to implement the appropriate policy so in
equilibrium, the option to override is never exercised.
Recently, a solution to eliminate the bias in monetary policy was proposed by Walsh (1995)
and Persson and Tabellini (1993). These authors show that an ination{performance contract,
which rewards (penalizes) the monetary authority for low (high) ination can be used to remove
the ination{bias in monetary monetary: in eect, restoring the pre{commitment monetary
policy. This contract solution has been extended to the case where there is persistence in
the unemployment rate (or employment level), as in Lockwood (1997) and Svensson (1997),
and to the case with uncertain central bank preferences as in Beetsma and Jensen (1997).
In Lockwood (1997) and Svensson (1997), it was shown that the equivalent ination contract
must necessarily be state{contingent in order to be able to restore the pre{commitment policy.
In this paper, we explore the use of ination performance contracts and targets in solving
a similar bias in monetary policy: one that occurs due to an economy's debt problems. As
noted by Sargent and Wallace (1981), scal decits which result in a debt burden may lead to
1A pre{commitment ination policy is one that ensures an ecient stabilization of output shocks, but at the
same time results in a zero expected ination level (see, for example, Lockwood (1997)).
1monetary expansions and higher ination rates. This is a more common problem in monetary
policymaking, especially in less developed countries (LDCs), but often ignored in research
aimed at institutional designs. In most LDCs, nancially unsustainable budgetary policies
force the monetary authorities to create money and therefore tolerate high levels of ination.
We rst show that a performance contract written for the central bank can be used to
remove the biases in monetary policy that result from the incentives to monetize debt. The
contract should be designed to depend on the outstanding debt level: that is, the central
bank is penalized (rewarded) for high (low) levels of ination, with the penalty increasing in
the level of outstanding debt. We then analyze scal and monetary policies if the authorities
set an ination target that is contingent on stock of debt and show that the contract and
target solutions are equivalent: they both remove all biases in ination policy and achieve the
pre{committment rule.
The latter result contrasts with Svensson (1997) who also considered performance contract
and ination target contingent on a dierent state variable, employment level. Svensson showed
that whereas a contract contingent on employment level restores the pre{committment ination
rule, an ination target only removes the positive ination{bias but leaves a bias in stabilization
of employment shocks. The reason for this dierence is the scal policy reaction to our contract
or target solution. In Svensson's model, only monetary policy is considered. In this paper, the
resulting equilibrium with a performance contract or ination target involves a higher interest
rate on all debt, which in turn makes it costly for the government to run large decits ensures
scal discipline. We argue that such scal discipline is all that is needed to restore the pre{
commitment policy. In our context, one can think of these mechanisms as explicitly shifting
the debt burden from the government to the central bank, and the bank reacting with a tighter
monetary policy.
Since the issue of decit nancing is one of the main reasons for making central banks more
independent from scal authorities (especially for less developed countries), one would think
that institutional reforms will be accompanied by such explicit contracts aimed at maintaining
low levels of ination. This will give the central banks more autonomy over monetary policy so
as to resist attempts by the government to nance decits by creating money. Such institutional
designs can also help eliminate potential conicts between scal and monetary authorities over
the direction of monetary policy.2
2Conicts between Finance Ministers and the Governors of Central Banks have been documented in many
countries over time. For example, James Coyne had to resign as Governor of the Bank of Canada in 1961 over
disagreement on the direction of interest rates.
2However, even though they seem desirable, such monetary policy agreements are hardly
observed in practice. One reason for this political: for example, a performance contract that
rewards the central banker for low ination will be politically unpopular if the same policy
results in low output, high unemployment or a drastic reduction in government spending (see
Goodhart and Vi~ nals (1994)).
Another reason is the impossibility of writing contracts or having targets contingent on the
realization of every state, as discussed in Persson and Tabellini (1993). Hence, more common
approach in monetary policy is to set a constant ination target or a simple ination rule
independent of output shocks, such as a zero-ination rule.3 We therefore compare society's
welfare (i.e, government's dynamic loss) in the case of a zero{ination rule to that of the game
in which a debt{contingent ination target is set or a performance contract is written for the
central bank. It is shown that the performance contract or target solution results in a higher
welfare.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In section 2, we outline the dynamic
model of the interaction between scal and monetary policies. We solve for a pre{commitment
monetary policy and then analyze a the outcome in a zero{ination target. We then show that
there is unique ination contract and target that achieves the pre{commitment outcome in the
model, hence equivalent. In section 3, we compare the welfare levels from a zero{ination rule
and the pre{commitment ination rule. Section 4 concludes the chapter.
2 A simple policy game with debt
We consider a dynamic policy game with monetary policy delegated to an independent central
bank. The features of the model is similar to Jensen (1994), with monetary policy delegated
to a central bank. Thus, the model consists of three agents: the government, a central bank
and the private sector. We follow the literature on policy games by characterizing the private
sector as a representative union whose sole objective is to achieve a target real wage through
nominal wage negotiations. For simplicity, we also assume that the central bank directly sets
the rate of ination, t:
The government (or scal authority) sets the capital tax rate (t) and determines the ratio
3In fact, Svensson (1997) shows that an appropriately chosen constant ination target is equivalent to a
designing a state{independent (or linear) performance contract that removes the average bias in monetary
policy.
3of government spending to output (gt): The government has a per{period budget constraint
given
gt + (1 + r)dt 1 = t + t + dt (1)
where dt is ratio of indexed debt to output. The government therefore nances its public
expenditures (including debt servicing) through the tax revenues, seigniorage and by issuing
indexed debt. The interest rate (r) on outstanding debt (dt 1) is assumed to be constant and
equal to the net rate of return on an outside investment opportunity available to an individual
investor.4 See the Appendix for more details and derivation of equation (1).
Production is undertaken in a competitive industry characterized by a Cobb{Douglas tech-
nology with labor as the only input. Aggregate output at time t is given by Yt = L

t eat; where
Lt denotes labor input and at is a supply shock. Firms maximize their prots taking the price
level, (nominal) wage contracts and the tax rate on revenue as given. This involves maximizing
a representative rm's prot function given by
t = PtL

t eat(1   )   WtLt;
where Wt is the nominal wage for period t: and Lt is the units of labor hired. Assuming
the supply of labor is perfectly elastic (workers willing to work any amount of hours at the
negotiated wage), then prot maximization implies that the (log of) aggregate output at time
t can be normalized as
yt = (pt   wt + log(1   t)) + t
where pt; wt are the logs of price level and nominal wage at time t;  =

1  and t = at
1 : We
assume t is i.i.d with mean zero and variance 2:
For simplicity, we also assume that workers (or the union) adopt the following rule in their






; where E[] denotes the expectation operator,
conditional on the union's information set, 
u
t 1; which includes the structural parameters,
state of the economy, preferences of the policymakers (see below) and the distribution of t:
Hence workers negotiate for nominal wage contracts based on their expectation of next period's







  pt 1; we can
write the aggregate output at time t as
yt = (t   e
t   t) + t (2)
4A xed interest rate and the use of indexed debt rules out non{linear debt dynamics and makes the model
more tractable. Furthermore, a xed interest rate can be justied if we are assuming a small open economy.
4where log(1 t) has been approximated by  t: This represents a Lucas{type supply function
augmented by taxes: higher tax rates lower output since they distort rms' labor demands and
a surprise ination increases output since it lowers the real wage.
The government, as well as the society, is assumed to have preferences dened over output,
ination and government expenditure. Specically, the government's per{period utility is given










where  and  are constants weights. The motivation for including spending in the government's
loss function is the same as in Jensen (1994): it reects the utility citizens derive from various
forms of spending, e.g, health programmes, education, etc. Hence, the government's objective
is to minimize the sum of ination variability, output deviations from a desired level, y > 0;
and deviations of the ratio of spending{to{output from its target, g > 0: Clearly, if t = e
t
and there are no output shocks, the government will have to provide a production subsidy at
the rate  =  
y
; in order to achieve the production target.








where  (0 <  < 1) is the discount factor and 
t 1 is the government's information set that
t: The government is assumed to know all the structural parameters, history and state of the
economy, preferences of the the central banker as well as the realization of t:
Monetary policy (or, in this case, ination control) is delegated to a central bank with
the mandate of maintaining price stability and ensuring sucient stabilization of output. In










The central bank has the same information as the government and, for simplicity, we assume
they have a common discount factor. Hence the only dierence in the objectives of the two
policymakers is that the central bank does not care about spending levels.5 The central bank
5Even within this formulation, it can be seen that the government's spending policy indirectly aects mon-
etary policy: revenue taxes to nance government expenditure distorts output, and since the bank cares about
output stabilization, this in turn forces the bank to set positive ination levels. Moreover, an alternate for-
mulation in which government expenditure explicitly enters the bank's loss function (but perhaps with a lesser
weight than the government's) will only lead to more seigniorage but will not alter the qualitative conclusion in
this paper. See also footnote 6.










We consider three institutional designs: a policy game with debt{contingent ination con-
tract or target, and one with a zero{ination policy. The timing of events in the economy is as
follows. Initially, the government decides on the institutional design; one of the above three.
The union then signs a one{period nominal wage contract before the output shock is realized.
After the realization of the output shock, the scal and monetary authorities choose their
policies independently. Finally, production takes place. Hence, the union acts as a Stackelberg
leader in the model, but scal and monetary policies are chosen in a Nash setting. See Alesina
and Tabellini (1987), Debelle and Fischer (1994) and Beetsma and Bovenberg (1997a,b) for
similar formulations.
Jensen (1994) analyzed a deterministic version of this economy (no output shocks) with
the government as the sole policymaker conducting both scal and monetary policies. He then
showed that it will not be advantageous for the government to give up monetary discretion
for zero ination in all periods. By introducing the central bank and analyzing a performance
contract and ination target, we able to extend his results to show that the contract achieves
the pre{commitment policy and also improves upon the welfare associated with a zero{ination
target.
2.1 Pre{commitment policy
We rst consider the case where the central bank is able to pre{commit to an ination rule, call
it r
t; before agents sign nominal wage contracts. Note that this is similar to an announcement
of the direction of monetary policy, and not the actual ination policy. Persson and Tabellini
(1993) show that in this case, the central bank will eectively be choosing e
t subject to the
constraint that e
t = Et 1t:
The optimal policies under commitment can be derived from the solutions to the central































subject to equations (1) and (2).
The rst order conditions are given by
(yt   y) + t + t = 0 (5)
Et 1(yt   y) + t = 0 (6)
 (yt   y) + (gt   g) = 0 (7)
(gt   g) + !0(dt) = 0 (8)
where t is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the constraint e
t = Et 1t: Eliminating t
from equation (5) and (6), we get
(yt   Et 1yt) + t = 0 (9)
which says that if output is lower than expected, then the gain from an increased ination,
in terms of increased output, must equal the cost in raising the ination rate. Equation (7)
states that the marginal cost of a unit increase in taxes (in terms of lost output) must equal
the marginal gain in terms of higher expenditures.6 Equation (8) shows that the gain from
increasing the debt position, in terms of higher government outlays, must be oset by the
discounted future losses that arise from a constrained set of policy choices.




[(gt   g)   Et 1(gt   g)]:
Taking expectations of this equation gives the expected ination rate, e
t = 0: Hence, if mon-
etary policy is delegated to an independent central bank with no incentive to monetize debt,
the pre-commitment policy will have an zero expected rate of ination every period. This can
be compared with an institution in which the government conducts both scal and monetary
policy. In such an economy, the government can never commit to a rule that results in zero
6Were we to introduce government spending into the Bank's loss function with a weight of, say, m (where
possibly, m < ), then equation (9) will be
(yt   Et 1yt) + m(gt   Et 1gt) + t = 0:
The subsequent analysis will be notationally complicated without any gain in the qualitative results.
7expected ination because the government cares about expenditures and there will always be
expectations of debt monetization (cf. equations (3) and (4)).
Substituting t and e
t = 0 into equation (7), we can solve for the tax rate in terms of the







[(gt   g)   Et 1(gt   g)]  





Dierentiating the government's value function with respect to dt 1 and forwarding the
resulting equation by one period yields the Benveniste{Scheinkman (1979) formula given by
!0(dt) =  (1 + r)Et(gt+1   g): Inserting this into equation (8) gives




Equation (11) describes the evolution of public expenditure deviations from the target level.
If (1 + r) > 1; then public expenditure level is expected to converge to the target level
through time. However if (1 + r) < 1; then the expected level of government spending
diverges innitely from its target level through time. This can only be sustained through
innite rounds of borrowing (or lending) which is not feasible. The model will then have an
equilibrium only if (1 + r) > 1 (see also Jensen (1994)). This is guaranteed by imposing the









This is the stochastic version of the condition in Jensen (1994), and requires that the expec-
tation of the discounted future debt must be zero.
Now, re{write equation (1), the government's budget constraint, as
dt = (gt   g) + g + (1 + r)dt 1   t   t:





(1 + r)j +
(1 + r)
r





(1 + r)j : (13)
Equation (13) states that the expectation of the present value of current and all future govern-
ment outlays must be equal to the expectation of future stream of revenues net of production
subsidies. Substituting the expression for t+j and t+j and making use of (11), we get
1
(1 + r)2
















8where 1 = 1 + 
2: Taking expectations through equation (14), gives the expected deviation
of spending to be
Et 1(gt   g) =  
1
1









The term in the curly brackets on the RHS of equation (15) is just the government budgetary
requirement: the sum of expenditure target, and tax subsidies and current interest obligations
on outstanding debt. If this sum is positive then the expected present level of the government
expenditure will be below the target level; that is, the government sacrices present spending
for the future.
Substituting (15) into equation (14) gives the deviation of actual expenditure from its
target level as
gt   g =  
1
1


















: Finally, inserting equation (16) and Et 1(gt   g) into the


















@ > 0: if  is large, then the government will be less concerned about
smooth output (relative to expenditures) and therefore t will be less variable. This implies
that ination will have to be more variable in order to stabilize output from its shocks. Also,
@var(P
t )
@ < 0 simply because a high  implies an aversion to ination variability. Finally, if
 is large enough
 









@ < 0: This is because for a
large enough ; a little ination will have a large eect of output so that is is relatively easier
to smooth output with monetary policy. Consequently, ination is less variable.














((1 + r)2   1)
t: (18)
From the debt dynamics in equation (18), we can calculate the steady states in the pre{
commitment policy game. In the steady state, there are no shocks to the economy and dt =








9model has steady{state properties similar to Jensen (1994); that is, the economy becomes a
net creditor in the long{run. In the steady state, all tax distortions would be eliminated:
ination is reduced to ss = 0 and the government provides rms with a subsidy at the rate
of ss =  
y
: Hence, the government achieves its spending and output targets through the
revenue from its lending program.
For purposes of welfare comparison in section 3, we nd the expected dynamic loss under














































2.2 Discretionary monetary policy with ination contract
As mentioned earlier, although the policy rule under commitment yields zero expected ination
and sucient stabilization of output shocks, it will be dicult to implement it without a
proper commitment device. The temptation to generate a \surprise" ination after nominal
wage contracts have been signed, means that the pre{commitment ination policy is time{
inconsistent. This is taken into account by the union when signing their wage contracts and
results in a positive bias in the ination rate as well as an inecient stabilization of output
shocks (see Kydland and Prescott (1977), Barro and Gordon (1983), Svensson (1997)).
In this section, we assume that the central bank cannot commit to r
t and therefore has
to resort to a discretionary monetary policy. However, following the work of Walsh (1995),
Persson and Tabellini (1993) and others, we investigate whether the government can design a
performance contract for the central bank that can achieve the pre{commitment policy in the
discretionary game. Since the state of the economy is characterized by the debt level, such
a contract will be contingent on the outstanding debt level, as shown Lockwood (1997) and
Svensson (1997).
Now, suppose at the beginning of every period the government oers the central bank a
contract fw0;ctg in which the bank receives some payo in terms of utility given by wt =
w0  ctt and ct = c0 +c1dt 1; where w0; c0 and c1 are constants. The central bank thus faces












  w0 + ctt + (dt)

(P:3)
subject to equations (2), taking agents expectation of ination, e
t; as given. The government's
problem remains the same, as in (P.2)
The rst order conditions from minimization of the loss functions in the contract game are
given by equations (7), (8) and
(yt   y) + t + ct = 0: (20)

















If there is no contract, c0 = c1 = 0; then as as long as spending is below its desired level,
ination is expected to be positive. In the discretionary policy game with no contract, the
central bank nances part of the shortfall of government spending by creating money. As agents
recognize this, e
t > 0: This is the positive ination{bias. If  is large, relative to ; then the bias
is larger since the government cares more about achieving the spending target than maintaining
a stable price level. Clearly, a necessary condition for removing all biases in discretionary
monetary policy is to nd some pair fc0;c1g such that (c0 + c1dt 1) =  Et 1(gt   g):
Substituting the expressions for t and e
t into equation (7), after some simplication, yields
the same expression for tax rate as in equation (10). Inserting the expressions for t and t
into the budget constraint (equation (1)), we get






+ (1 + ^ r)dt 1 +


((gt   g)   Et 1(gt   g))  
t

where 2 = 1 + 
2 + 
; and ^ r = r + c1
 becomes the net rate of interest on outstanding
debt. Due to this new debt dynamics and the higher interest paid on outstanding debt, the






(1 + ^ r)j

= 0: (21)
11Applying this restriction to future debt, and making use equation (11), gives
2
(1 + r)(1 + ^ r)
(1 + r)(1 + ^ r)   1
(gt   g) +














  Et 1(gt   g)) +
t

and taking expectations through this equation gives the expected expenditure deviation as
Et 1(gt   g) =  
1
2
(1 + r)(1 + ^ r)   1











and the actual deviation of spending from its target level to be
gt   g =  
1
2
(1 + r)(1 + ^ r)   1

















(1+r)(1+^ r) 1 + 

 1
















It is easy to see that if the central bank is not oered a performance contract, that is























Equation (24) shows that if no contract is oered, the discretionary game results in a positive
bias and a stabilization bias in the ination policy. The positive ination{bias (rst term on










and a debt{contingent bias given by 
2
(1+r)2 1
(1+r) dt 1: Furthermore, we have
 
1(1 + r)2
















(1 + r)2   1
< 0;
since 1 = 1 + 
2 < 2 = 1 + 
2 + 
. Hence, the discretionary policy without contract, d
t
involves an inecient stabilization of output shocks. This is the stabilization bias (see also
Lockwood (1997)).
The rst objective of the paper is to investigate whether a government will be able to
design a performance contract that will eliminate these biases and restore the pre{commitment
outcome. Recall that to be able to remove the biases associated with a discretionary policy,
it is necessary that the contract fc0;c1g be designed such that c0 + c1dt 1 =  Et 1(gt   g):
Our rst result (below) shows that such a contract can be designed in this economy and it can
also eliminate the stabilization bias.






















which achieves the pre{commitment ination policy in the monetary discretionary game.
Proof: By setting c0 +c1dt 1 = Et 1(gt  g); which is given in equation (22), it is clear that




(1 + r)(1 + ^ r)   1
(1 + r)
:
With ^ r = r + c1





(1 + r)2   1
(1 + r)
:




(1 + r)(1 + ^ r)   1



































1g eliminates the average and state{contingent bias in the discretionary ination
policy. It remains to show that the same pair fc
0;c
1g can also eliminate the stabilization bias.
But using c1 = 
2
(1+r)(1+^ r) 1

































where we make use ^ r = r +
c
1
 and the expression for c
1 in the second equality. The last
equation is the same as the pre-commitment policy in equation (17). 2
Proposition 1 shows that the government can oer a performance contract to the central
bank that achieves the pre{commitment outcome at all times. Since c
1 > 0; the ination con-
tract rewards (penalizes) the central bank for lower (higher) rates of ination. As in Lockwood
13(1997), the ination contract is also contingent on the state of the economy (which is the debt
level in this economy) because it should be able to eliminate the debt{contingent ination bias
as well.
With this ination contract, the government shifts the debt burden explicitly onto the cen-
tral bank: the higher the debt level, the more severe is the penalty for bad ination performance
precisely because the temptation to monetize is greater with a large debt. The central bank




Hence, this contract is equivalent to a discrete jump in the interest rate on outstanding debt.
This increases the cost of borrowing by the government and serves to ensure scal discipline.
It can easily be shown that
@c
1
@ > 0; so that, with a performance{contract, monetary policy
will be tighter if  is high. Intuitively, a high  implies that the government is relatively more
concerned with smooth expenditures and there is a larger incentive to create money to nance
spending.
2.3 Discretionary monetary policy with ination target
Next, we analyze the possibility of using a debt{contingent ination target to remove the biases
in ination in a discretionary game. Suppose that the government sets a target for ination
contingent on outstanding debt. That is, targ
t = 0 + 1dt 1:















subject to equation (2), and taking agents expectation of ination, e
t; as given. The govern-















subject to equation (1) and (2).7
The rst order conditions from minimization of the loss functions are given by equations (7),
(8) and
(yt   y) + (t   0   1dt 1) = 0 (25)
7We assume both authorities share the same concern of minimizing the variation of actual ination around
the target, hence the dierence in objectives continues to be the absence of government spending in the bank's
loss function.
14In addition, the Benveniste{Scheinkman equation is
gt   g = (1 + r)Et(gt   g) +
1

Et[t+1   (0 + 1dt)]:
Since we seek a solution that eliminates positive ination{bias, it must be that Et[t+1  
(0+1dt)] = 0 if such a 0 and 1 exist. With this solution, the above Benveniste{Scheinkman




(gt   g) + 0 + 1dt 1:





Et 1(gt   g) + 0 + 1dt 1:
As before, a necessary condition for removing all biases in discretionary monetary policy is to
nd some pair f0;1g such that 0 + 1dt 1 = 
Et 1(gt   g):
Substituting the expressions for t and e
t into equation (7) yields the tax policy in equa-
tion (10). Inserting the expressions for t and t into the budget constraint (equation (1)), we
get
dt = 2(gt   g) + g +
y

  0 + (1 + ~ r)dt 1 +


((gt   g)   Et 1(gt   g))  
t

where ~ r = r   1 becomes the net rate of interest on outstanding debt. This debt dynamics
has the same form as found under the ination contract, except the government's budgetary






and the eective gross rate on outstanding is (1+~ r):






(1 + ~ r)j

= 0 (26)
and the expected expenditure deviation to be
Et 1(gt   g) =  
1
2
(1 + r)(1 + ~ r)   1





+ 0 + ~ rdt 1

: (27)
The the actual deviation of spending from its target level is then given by







(1+r)(1+~ r) 1 + 

 1













15The next proposition shows that the ination target can be designed to eliminate the
stabilization bias. As noted, a necessary condition for this is to have 0+1dt 1 = 
Et 1(gt 
g):
Proposition 2 There is a debt{contingent ination target T



















which achieves the pre{commitment ination policy in the monetary discretionary game.
Proof: By setting 0+1dt 1 = 
Et 1(gt g); which is given in equation (27), it is clear that




(1 + r)(1 + ~ r)   1
(1 + r)
:





(1 + r)2   1
(1 + r)
:























1g eliminates the average and state{contingent bias in the discretionary ination
policy. Finally, we show that 
1 can also eliminate the stabilization bias. Using the expression

1 and 1 + ~ r = 1 + r   













































which is the same as the pre-commitment policy in equation (17)2
The debt{contingent ination target with 0 = 
0 and 1 = 
1 removes all biases in
monetary policy and achieves the pre{commitment ination rule. An examination of the
16ination contract and target shows that both solutions result in a higher and equal interest
rate on the stock of debt since 1 =  c1
 : It therefore follows that, with debt monetization
problems, a simple solution to the ination{bias problem is a hike in the rate of interest to
ensure scal discipline, hence restoring the pre{commitment rule.
In spite of the positive appeal of the above ination contract and target, they are rarely
observed in practice. Whereas it more common these days to observe explicit constant ination
targets or rule, ination performance contracts are almost non{existence: not even simple (and
linear) performance contracts independent of a state variable. This is partly because any such
contracts may be too sophisticated to implement and subject to political criticisms, especially
if other state variables (e.g., employment and output level) have to be taken into account.
For example, a widely cited form of an ination contract is the one proposed in New Zealand
in which the Governor of the Reserve Bank is rewarded (or penalized) according to ination
performance. But even then, this contract was rejected by government ocials on the grounds
that it would invoke headlines in the press such as \Governor makes $500;000 by taking action
to throw 500;000 out of work" (see Goodhart (1994)). Moreover, they are totally non{existent
in countries with debt problems.
In the next section, we analyze the game with a zero{ination rule and then compare
welfare under the diferrent regimes in section 3.
2.4 Zero Ination Policy
We now suppose that the central bank follows a zero ination rule all periods. This is equivalent
to a zero ination announcement which is believed and implemented at all times.
The optimal scal policies under this monetary policy can be derived from the rst order
conditions to the government's maximization problem given in equations (7) and (8). Substi-
tuting t = e
t = 0 into equation (7), we can solve for the optimal tax rate in terms of the










and the per{period debt level will be









Using the evolution of public expenditure deviation derived in equation (11), and applying
17equation (13), we get the deviation of actual expenditure from its target level to be
gt   g =  
1
1

































((1 + r)2   1)
t: (30)
To complete the analysis under the zero{ination target policy, we nd the the government's



















































The zero{ination rule is simpler and much more feasible in practice. More generally,
constant ination targets and rules (or a target range) have become increasingly common in
several countries (e.g., Canada and New Zealand). But as shown by Svensson (1997) and
in this paper, if there is persistent in a state variable, such targets can only eliminate some
but not all biases in monetary policy: for example, the zero{ination rule does not involve
stabilization of output shocks.
In the next section, we show that the optimal contract fc
0;c
1g in Proposition 1 or optimal
target f
0;
1g in Proposition 2 results in a higher expected welfare.
3 Welfare analysis
In this section we compare the government's dynamic loss (or welfare) under an ination{
performance contract or target with welfare under a zero ination rule. Since the contract and
target solutions achieve the same outcome as the pre{commitment policy, the welfare levels are
18equal. Hence, the analysis reduces to comparing the dynamic losses in equation (19) (contract
or target) and (31) (zero{ination rule).
Both dynamic loss functions consists of two terms, a state{contingent term given by the rst
term and a time{invariant term given by the second. The rst terms are the same and vanishes
in the steady state since all distortions are removed from the economy and the government is
able to subsidize output to its desired level. However, there is an additional loss that comes
from the disturbance term, t; and is captured in the second term. This reects the loss arising
from the aggregate uncertainty in the economy, irrespective of the debt position.
Proposition 3 Given any debt level, the government will better o oering the performance
contract fc
0;c
1g or setting the ination target f
0;
1g than adopting the zero{ination policy.
Proof: To prove this, we show that !P(dt 1) < !Z(dt 1): that is, the expected dynamic loss
from a performance contract is strictly less than the dynamic loss with zero ination policy.
But this is straight{forward by comparing the second terms in !P(dt 1) and !T(dt 1) (Note
that the rst terms are the same). We therefore have




















(1   4) < 0
since 1   4 < 0: Hence, !P(dt 1) < !Z(dt 1):2
The government has a smaller expected dynamic loss if it oers an ination performance
contract to the central bank. This is true even in the steady state. This is because, a zero{
ination policy leads to higher variation in scal policies (and subsequently, higher output
variance) which results in higher expected losses. In contrast, a state{contingent contract or
target allows for optimal stabilization of output shocks and reduces the variation in output
and public expenditure levels.
4 Conclusion
Following the work of Walsh (1995), recent research on monetary policy has focused on how
performance contract may be design to rid monetary policy of its ination bias. In particular,
19Svensson (1996) and Lockwood (1997) analyzed how an ination contract can be used to resolve
the biases in monetary discretion when unemployment is persistent. These authors show that
the bias in monetary policy can be removed, and the pre{commitment policy restored, with a
state{contingent ination performance contract written for the central bank. Such a contract
rewards the bank for keeping ination low.
In this paper we extend the contract analysis to the problem of debt. With a high debt
level, agents expectation of debt monetization leads to a similar ination{bias in monetary
discretion. It is shown that it is possible to achieve the pre{commitment policy rule with a
debt{contingent ination contract or target. The two solutions explicitly shifts the debt burden
from the government to the central bank, and the bank reacts by tightening monetary policy.
The resulting equilibrium yields a higher interest rate on outstanding debt. This mimics the
fact that agents will always demand a higher interest rate on government debt to account for
the risk of debt monetization.
It is also shown that, in this model, the debt{contingent performance contract or target
results in a higher welfare level than if the central bank were to follow a zero{ination pol-
icy at all times. This shows that, though it may be dicult to implement, a well{designed
performance contract can enhance monetary policy, ensure scal discipline and improve upon
welfare, especially in indebted countries. Finally, it must be emphasized that such contracts
must be accompanied by the necessary institutional arrangements that increases commitment
else it would be open to McCallum's (1995) critique: that is, the government will have the
incentive to renege on the contract so that the time{inconsistent problem still remains.
20Appendix
Derivation of equation (1):
The derivation of the government's budget constraint (equation (1)) follows Beetsma and
Bovenberg (1997a). Nominal money at time t is assumed to be given by Mt = PtY ; where Y
is the real output level in the absence of any distortions in the economy (the anti{log of y).
This is the desired level of output. The change in nominal money supply will then be
Mt   Mt 1 = (Pt   Pt 1)Y : (A:1)
We rst write the government's budget constraint in nominal terms as
PtGt + (1 + r)PtDt 1 = tPtYt + (Mt   Mt 1) + PtDt (A:2)
where Gt is total expenditure, Dt is amount of indexed debt issued by the government at time
t, Mt is money supply and r is the (xed) net nominal interest rate. The debt is indexed in
the sense that it is issued at price Pt 1 but redeemed at price Pt: The interest r is assumed
to equal the rate of return on an outside investment opportunity available to the individual
investor. Hence, such an investor will be willing to invest in the government bonds if its rate
of return is at least equal to r: Since the government tries to borrow at the minimum costs,
it oers the rate r on its debt. Dividing equation (A.2) by PtY and using (A.1), the budget
constraint can be written as
gt + rdt 1 = t
Yt
Y
+ t(1 + t) 1 + dt (A:3)
where gt and dt are ratios of expenditure and debt to the desired nominal output respectively.
Finally, approximating t(1 + t) 1 by t and Yt by Y ; we get equation (1) in the text.
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